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COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
and fifty cents per week for the child's support. The Department then sought
to obtain the difference from the child's stepmother. The question in Depart-
mnent of Welfare of The City of New York v. Siebel,39 is twofold. The first
concerns the interpretation of Section 56-a, i.e., whether the word "or," be-
tween "parents of the child" and "other person legally chargeable" was intended
to mean only one or the other in the alternative, or was it intended in the
conjunctive. The second is whether Section 101 of the Domestic Relations
Court Act of the City of New York means that the liability of the defendant
should be jointly secondarily liable with the mother and grandparents. 40 The
Domestic Relations Court of the City of New York entered an order directing
defendant to pay twenty dollars per month. This was reversed by the Appel-
late Division, which in turn was reversed by the Court of Appeals,
The words "and" and "or," when used in a statute may be synonymous.
The substitution of one for the other is frequently resorted to in the interpreta-
tion of statutes when the evident intention of the legislature requires it.41 It
has already been held in a lower court decision that where the father cannot
adequately support the children, the mother, if able, must help to do So.42 The
Court here followed the lead of Wignall v. Wignall,43 holding that the word
"or" must be construed to mean "and" to validate the intent of the legislature.
The defendant was thus chargeable with the child's support where the father
was only partly able to support the child.
As to whether defendant was secondarily liable with the mother and
grandparents, or only liable after the aforementioned two, the Court held that
the legislature intended the former.
Holding as it has, the Court gives effect to the obvious intention of the
legislative branch to ease the burden on governmental welfare agencies by
expanding actions for contribution from financially able members of the child's
family. Whether they are such members by blood or by choice should not be
significant in this matter, the relationship, however established, should control.
POWER OF APPELLATE DIVISION TO CONTROL ATTORNEY'S CONTINGENT FEES
Section 83 of the New York Judiciary Law provides: "That the Supreme
Court shall have power and cojtrol over attorneys and counselors-at-law . ..
and the Appellate Division . . .in each Department is authorized to censure,
suspend from practice or remove ...any attorney and counselor-at-law . ..
of Welfare may investigate the parents of the child, or other persons legally chargeable
to see if they are able to contribute in whole or in part the expense incurred by the City
of New York for the maintenance of that child, and, if so, should institute a proceeding
against them.
39. 6 N.Y.2d 536, 190 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1959).
40. Section 101 of the Domestic Relations Court Act of the City of New York
sets out those who are legally liable for support. They are the father, and under certain
conditions, the mother, grandparents, and stepparents.
41. People v. Rice, 138 N.Y. 151, 33 N.E. 846 (1893).
42. Wignall v. Wignall, 163 Misc. 910, 298 N.Y. Supp. 251 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1937).
43. Ibid.
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who is guilty of professional misconduct, malpractice, fraud, deceit, . . . or any
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice."
Section 90(2) provides: "A majority of the Justices of the Appellate Divi-
sion in each Department, by order of such majority, shall have the power
from time to time, to adopt, amend or rescind any Special rule for such De-
partment not inconsistent with any statute or rule of civil practice." (Emphasis
added).
The question presented in Gair v. Peck4 4 was whether the above statu-
tory provisions empowered the Appellate Division, First Department, to adopt
its Rule 4 relating to contingent fee agreements 45 or whether that Court was
prohibited from doing so by Section 474 of the Judiciary Law, which states:
that "compensation of an attorney or counselor-at-law is governed by agree-
ment, . . . not restrained by law." The Third Department had affirmed a
judgment declaring that the First Department had no power to adopt Rule 440
In reversing this determination the Court of Appeals held, (5-2), that
the Rule was a valid exercise of the Appellate Division's supervisory power
over the conduct of attorneys, under Sections 83 and 90(2).
44. 6 N.Y.2d 97, 183 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1959).
45. The relevant portions of this rule are as follows:
Rule 4. Contingent Fees in Claims and Actions for Personal Injury and
Wrongful Death.
(a) In any claim or action for personal injury or wrongful death, whether
determined by judgment or settlement, in which the compensation of
claimant's or plaintiff's attorneys is contingent, that is, dependent in whole
or in part upon the amount of the recovery, the receipt, retention or
sharing by such attorneys pursuant to agreement or otherwise, of com-
pensation which is equal to or less than the fees scheduled below is deemed
to be fair and reasonable. The receipt, retention or sharing of compensa-
tion which is in excess of such scheduled fees shall constitute the excava-
tion of unreasonable and unconscionable compensation in violation of
Canons 12 and 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the New York
State Bar Association unless authorized by a written order of the court as
hereinafter provided.
(b) The following is the schedule of reasonable fees referred to above;
either,
(1)
(A) Fifty per cent. on the first one thousand dollars of the sum
recovered,
(B) Forty per cent. on the next two thousand dollars of the sum
recovered,
(C) Thirty-five per cent. on the next twenty-two thousand dollars
of the sum recovered,
(D) Twenty-five per cent. on any amount over twenty-five thousand
dollars of the sum recovered; or;
(2)
A percentage not exceeding thirty-three and a third per cent. of
the sum recovered, if the initial contractual arrangement between the
client and the attorneys so provides, in which event the procedure
hereinafter provided for making application for additional compensa-
tion because of extraordinary circumstances shall not apply.
[Subdivision (d) provides for the procedure in making application for additional com-
pensation because of extraordinary circumstances which make the schedule set out in (b)-1
inadequate.]
46. 5 A.D.2d 303, 171 N.Y.S.2d 594 (3d Dep't 1958), aff'g 6 Misc. 2d 739, 169
N.Y.S.2d 247.
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Both lower courts had read Rule 4 as purporting to alter the substantive
law governing the attorney-client relationship, and as such, attempting to
regulate an attorney's compensation in a manner conflicting with Section 474.
The Court of Appeals stated that this conclusion follows from a fallacious con-
struction of Rule 4. The Rule does not change the substantive law in regard
to the attorney client relationship, but merely supplies the procedure for the
Appellate Division to determine whether an attorney is subject to discipline
for exacting unconscionable fees. The lower courts, and the dissent by Judge
Burke, assume that the Rule prohibits retainer agreements, which are otherwise
enforceable under Section 474, and threatens disciplinary action against
lawyers who make such agreements. The Court states that the scope of the
Rule is limited "to making provision for disciplining attorneys for receiving
more from their clients than could legally be collected under retainer agree-
ments, even with the aid of Section 474 of the Judiciary Law." 47
Notwithstanding Section 474, the courts have traditionally exercised a
power of supervision over fees, as to their reasonableness.4" In doing so, the
courts have branded as unconscionable, those contingent fee agreements which
they have deemed exorbitant. While a 50% fee may not be unconscionable
per se, the amount may be so large that a contract, fair in its inception, becomes
unfair in its enforcement, and the lawyer's retention of the percentage is
unjust.49 It is in such situations that the court, in the past, has deemed fees to
be unenforceable. Rule 4 reaches only fees thus censurable prior to its adop-
tion, and provides a procedural scheme by which the Court may determine if
the contingent agreement is prima facie censurable.
The essence of Rule 4 is that in cases where an attorney seeks to impose
a contingent percentage that is in excess of the scheduled maximum, he must
indicate in the retainer agreement his reasons for doing so, and that application
will be made to the court after a recovery is had, to justify this excess per-
centage. This makes adequate provision for unusual circumstances which may
arise. The Court indicates that the Appellate Division could require that all
attorneys file a closing statement itemizing time spent on the case and enu-
merating all other elements of expense, and that such a rule would be within
the power of the Appellate Division under the Judiciary Law.50 However, it
has chosen to dispense with this requirement where the fee is below the per-
47. Supra note 44 at 105, 188 N.Y.S.2d 496, 497.
48. Ward v. Orsini, 243 N.Y. 123, 152 N.E. 696 (1926); Morehouse v. Brooklyn
Heights Ry. Co., 185 N.Y. 520, 78 N.E. 179 (1906); see also, In re Dresnick, 2 A.D.2d
521, 157 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1st Dep't 1956), where the Court upheld Rule 1-B of the First
Department, which prescribed a standard of conduct directly affecting the compensation
of attorneys. That Rule prevented an attorney assigned as counsel in a criminal case,
from accepting compensation except as authorized by Court. This regulation was held, to
be within the rule making power of the Appellate Division under Section 90(2). For a
general discussion of the power of -the Appellate Division under Section 83 see People v.
Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928).
49. In re Friedman, 136 App. Div. 75,, 121 N.Y. Supp. 426, aff'd 199 N.Y. 537, 92
N.E. 1085 (1910).
50. People v. Culkin, supra note 48.
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centage scheduled, and only require additional information where the fee is in
excess of the schedule. This is merely a procedure by which the attorney can
justify his relations with his client, where the circumstances call for such
justification.
Thus, Rule 4 calls for a determination regarding the attorneys conduct,
after the services contracted for have been rendered, but before the fee is paid.
The fee scheduled is merely presumptive of what is an unconscionable fee in
an individual case since an attorney may come into court and justify a fee in
excess of the stated maximum. The effect of this procedure is to make an ad
hoc determination, after the services are rendered, whether this fee could be
collected in an action between attorney and client.
In the interest of better facilitating its administrative function, in regard
to the disciplining attorneys, the Appellate Division has chosen to remove from
its consideration contingent fee arrangements which are within the standards
imposed. In so doing, it has not only narrowed the scope of its supervisory
powers, but has concentrated them on an area where the need for such super-
vision has been greatly felt.
The Appellate Division's finding that this Rule is inconsistent with Sec-
tion 474, as attempting to regulate the attorney-client relationship, is met by
interpreting Rule 4 as codifying, in effect, the supervisory power of the courts
as to the reasonableness of fees, which existed prior to Rule 4 and notwith-
standing Section 474. The argument that the Appellate Division lacks power
to discipline attorneys except in the individual case and after the event is
obviated by the Court of Appeals by showing that Rule 4 applies after the
services are rendered, albeit before payment, and that an individual attorney
has opportunity to justify his fee by showing facts that rebut the prima facie
determination that the fee is unconscionable.
Judge Burke, in dissenting, would be persuaded by the conclusion reached
by several bar associations in studies made concerning court regulation of
contingent fees. He would adopt their conclusion, and hold that the Court had
no power to regulate fees, absent permissive legislation on the subject.61
In viewing the majority contention as to the false assumption made in the
lower courts, that Rule 4 threatened disciplinary action against attorneys who
made agreements that were otherwise enforceable under Section 474, Judge
Burke would hold this lower assumption to be valid. His reasoning here is
that Rule 4 proscribes fees in excess of 33%%o, while the courts have previ-
ously allowed 50% recoveries. This conclusion, however, appears to be lack-
ing in logical support. The majority would not read Rule 4 as conclusively
branding 50% fees as being unconscionable under all the circumstances, but
merely presumptively so, and the analysis by the court in cases involving a
fee in excess of the maximum would be subject to the same considerations
51. 31 NEw YoRKx STATE BAR Ass'N. REP. 121 (1908); 80 Ass'N or BAR oF CiTY
NEw Yonn No. 649 (1943); ANN. REP. Ass'I or BAR or Cni" Or NEw YORK (1938)
295-296.
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as were those under court scrutiny before Rule 4. This can hardly be viewed
as a statement that all fees in excess of 33% are proscribed, rather, they are
allowable to the same extent as previously. If one accepts Judge Burke's
analysis that Rule 4 does prohibit agreements otherwise enforcible under
Section 474, his conclusion is inescapable. However, in view of the majority
articulation of the procedural nature of the Rule, his conclusion is not
justified.
Judge Froessel, also dissenting, would find the presumption of uncon-
scionableness, regarding excessive fee arrangements, to be a prior restraint on
an attorney's contractual freedom under Section 474. However, in so denounc-
ing the Rule he in fact admits the point relied upon by the majority, that these
percentages are no more than presumptions. He feels that "the case law under
Section 474 of the Judiciary Law indicates that the function of the Court is to
determine whether the facts surrounding the agreement in any given case show
that the attorney took advantage of the confidential relationship and perpe-
trated a fraud upon his client."' 52 Query: is this function any different than that
which would occur under Rule 4? It is submitted that the result under Rule 4
is the same as the functional role of the court prior to its adoption. The Court
has eliminated fees within prescribed limits from its consideration; as to those
above these limits, the Court retains its prior supervisory control in all its vigor,
and has provided more effective machinery to effectuate this functional role.
"If the consequence of the enforcement of this simple and practical rule
be to reduce the number of lawyers who are charging unconscionable fees, that
can furnish no basis on which to impugn the rule as a fee regulating measure.
All regulation of improper practices has its consequences or should have in
curtailing the practices .... The practice of charging unlawful fees is bound
to be curtailed by the exercise of disciplinary powers, whether the fees are
found to be unconscionable before or after they are paid." 53
Thus, Rule 4 is viewed not as a fee regulating provision, but rather as a
traditional exercise of the courts' power to make rules for the conduct of those
who practice before it.
52. Supra note 44 at 124, 188 N.Y.S.2d 513.
53. Supra note 44 at 109, 110, 188 N.Y.S.2d 491, 500.
